Ian M Church

"This book centers on two dominant trends within contemporary epistemology: first, the dissatisfaction with the project of analyzing knowledge in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions and, second, the surging popularity of virtue-theoretic approaches to knowledge. Church argues that the Gettier Problem, the primary reason for abandoning the reductive analysis project, cannot viably be solved, and that prominent approaches to virtue epistemology fail to solve the Gettier Problem precisely along the lines his diagnosis predicts. Such an outcome motivates Church to explore a better way forward: non-reductive virtue epistemology. In so doing, he makes room for virtue epistemologies that are not only able to endure what he sees as inevitable developments in 21st-century epistemology, but also able to contribute positively to debates and discussions across the discipline and beyond."--

Abstract

This book centers on two trends in contemporary epistemology: (i) the dissatisfaction with the reductive analysis of knowledge and (ii) the popularity of virtue-theoretic epistemologies. The goal is to endorse non-reductive virtue epistemology. Given that prominent renditions of virtue epistemology assume the reductive model, however, such a move is not straightforward—work needs to be done to elucidate what is wrong with the reductive model, in general, and why reductive accounts of virtue epistemology, specifically, are lacking. The first part of the book involves diagnosing the Gettier Problem (perhaps the central challenge for any reductive analysis) and defending that diagnosis against objections. The second part involves applying this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology. The third and final part of this book explores of what non-reductive virtue epistemology should look like, with the aim of establishing a new form of non-reductive virtue epistemology--a type of non-reductive proper functionalism--that is able draw from the strength of the aforementioned trends and contribute positively to a number of debates and discussions across the discipline and beyond.

Why care about intellectual humility? What is an intellectual virtue? How do we know who is intellectually humble? The nature of intellectual virtues is a topic of ancient interest. But contemporary philosophy has experienced unparalleled energy and concern for one particular virtue over the past 30 years: intellectual humility. Intellectual Humility: An Introduction to the Philosophy and Science draws on leading research to provide an engaging and up-to-date guide to understanding what it is and why it's important. By using ten big questions to introduce the concept, this introduction presents a vibrant account of the ideas behind intellectual humility. Covering themes from philosophy, psychology, education, social science, and divinity, it addresses issues such as: What human cognition tells us about intellectual virtues ; The extent to which traits and dispositions are stable from birth or learned habits ; How emotions affect our ability to be intellectually humble ; The best way to handle disagreement ; The impact intellectual humility has on religion or theological commitments. Written for students taking the University of Edinburgh's online course, this textbook is for anyone interested in finding out more about intellectual humility, how it can be developed and where it can be applied. -- Provided by publisher.

Luck permeates our lives, and this raises a number of pressing questions: What is luck? When we attribute luck to people, circumstances, or events, what are we attributing? Do we have any obligations to mitigate the harms done to people who are less fortunate? And to what extent is deserving praise or blame affected by good or bad luck? Although acquiring a true belief by an uneducated guess involves a kind of luck that precludes knowledge, does all luck undermine knowledge? The academic literature has seen growing, interdisciplinary interest in luck, and this volume brings together and explains the most important areas of this research. It consists of 39 newly commissioned chapters, written by an internationally acclaimed team of philosophers and psychologists, for a readership of students and researchers. Its coverage is divided into six sections: I: The History of Luck II: The Nature of Luck III: Moral Luck IV: Epistemic Luck V: The Psychology of Luck VI: Future Research. The chapters cover a wide range of topics, from the problem of moral luck, to anti-luck epistemology, to the relationship between luck attributions and cognitive biases, to meta-questions regarding the nature of luck itself, to a range of other theoretical and empirical questions. By bringing this research together, the Handbook serves as both a touchstone for understanding the relevant issues and a first port of call for future research on luck. "This is an essential guidebook for anyone whose work engages conceptual or empirical questions about luck and related phenomena. It will be of great interest and use to anyone working in epistemology, philosophy of action, ethics, social and political philosophy, and the history of philosophy. This comprehensive volume boasts a long list of first-class contributors – Church and Hartman deserve hearty thanks and congratulations." --E.J. Coffman, The University of Tennessee 　　 　 "Debates about luck are central to a range of philosophical debates, from epistemology to free will. This impressive volume presents the state of art across this range, and extends it into new areas. It will be a central reference point for years to come." --Neil Levy, Macquarie University Ian M. Church is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Hillsdale College. He is the co-author (with Peter Samuelson) of Intellectual Humility: An Introduction to the Philosophy & Science (2017). Robert J. Hartman is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow with the Lund-Gothenburg Responsibility Project at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. He is the author of In Defense of Moral Luck: Why Luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness (2017). 　 Section I: History of Luck Nafsika Athanassoulis: Aristotle on Constitutive, Developmental, and Resultant Moral Luck Sarah Broadie: Aristotle on Luck, Happiness, and Solon’s Dictum René Brouwer: The Stoics on Luck Jeffrey Hause: Thomas Aquinas on Moral Luck Kate Moran: Immanuel Kant on Moral Luck Craig Smith: Adam Smith on Moral Luck and the Invisible Hand Piers Norris Turner: John Stuart Mill on Luck and Distributive Justice Dani Rabinowitz: History of Luck in Epistemology Andrew Latus: Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams on Moral Luck Section II: The Nature of Luck Duncan Pritchard: Modal Accounts of Luck Wayne Riggs: The Lack of Control Account of Luck Nicholas Rescher: The Probability Account of Luck Rik Peels: The Mixed Account of Luck Nathan Ballantyne & Samuel Kampa: Luck and Significance Fernando Broncano-Berrocal: Luck as Risk Rachel Mckinnon: Luck and Norms Section III: Moral Luck Daniel Statman: The Definition of ‘Luck’ and the Problem of Moral Luck Carolina Sartorio: Kinds of Moral Luck Michael J. Zimmerman: Denying Moral Luck Robert J. Hartman: Accepting Moral Luck Laura W. Ekstrom: Luck and Libertarianism Mirja Pérez de Calleja: Luck and Compatibilism Section IV: Epistemic Luck Ian M. Church: The Gettier Problem Benjamin Jarvis: The Problem of Environmental Luck Tim Black: Anti-Luck Epistemology Stephen Hetherington: The Luck/Knowledge Incompatibility Thesis John Greco: Luck and Skepticism J. Adam Carter: Epistemic Luck and the Extended Mind Section V: The Psychology of Luck Steven D. Hales & Jennifer Adrienne Johnson: Cognitive Biases and Dispositions in Luck Attributions Karl Halvor Teigen: Luck and Risk Sabine Roeser: Emotional Responses to Luck, Risk and Uncertainty Anastasia Ejova: The Illusion of Control Matthew D. Smith & Piers Worth: Positive Psychology and Luck Experiences Section VI: Future Research J. D. Trout: Luck in Science Joe Milburn & Edouard Machery: The Philosophy of Luck and Experimental Philosophy Ori J. Herstein: Legal Luck Carolyn McLeod & Jody Tomchishen: Feminist Approaches to Moral Luck Guy Axtell: The New Problem of Religious Luck Jordan Wessling: Theology and Luck