Ian M Church

While experimental philosophy has fruitfully applied the tools and resources of psychology and cognitive science to debates within epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics, relatively little work has been done within philosophy of religion. And this isn’t due to a lack of need! Philosophers of religion frequently rely on empirical claims that can be either verified or disproven, but without exploring whether they are. And philosophers of religion frequently appeal to intuitions which may vary wildly according to education level, theological background, etc., without concern for whether or not the psychological mechanisms that underwrite those intuitions are broadly shared or reliable. In this chapter, I explore some of the fruit and possibilities for the emerging field of experimental philosophy of religion. First, in Section 1, I will elucidate some of the historical grounding for experimental philosophy of religion. Then in Section 2, I briefly consider how the tools and resources of experimental philosophy might be fruitfully applied to a seminal topic within philosophy of religion, namely, the problem of evil. In Section 3, we’ll sketch some broader applications of experimental philosophy of religion.

A case could be made that the practice of philosophy demands a certain humility, or at least intellectual humility, requiring such traits as inquisitiveness, openness to new ideas, and a shared interest in pursuing truth. In the positive psychology movement, the study of both humility and intellectual humility has been grounded in the methods and approach of personality psychology, specifically the examination of these virtues as traits. Consistent with this approach, the chapter begins with a discussion of the examination of intellectual humility as a “character trait,” comparing intellectual humility to various well-known traits in the personality psychology literature (e.g the “Big 5” and the “Big 2”) as well as other key traits such as the need for cognition and the need for closure. The chapter then turns to the proverbial issue of whether virtues in general, and intellectual humility in particular, are a matter of “nature”- that is, an innate trait determined by heritability, or “nurture” – a trait mostly shaped by situation and environment. While the chapter does not resolve the issue, it provides occasion for an examination of the role of situations in the expression of intellectual humility, and for the interaction of “situation” and “trait.” The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the interaction of trait with situation provides the most robust understanding of the psychology of any character virtue, including humility and intellectual humility.

According to the problem of divine hiddenness, if God is perfectly loving, he would make it so that anyone capable of having a personal relationship with him would be able to reasonably believe that God exists. Given that some people do not believe in the existence of God – and after careful, sincere investigation and due to no fault of their own – then such a perfectly loving God does not exist. In this chapter, I will, in §1, consider this argument in greater detail and suggest that it rests on two key assumptions: what I’ll be calling the perfectly loving assumption and the no-fault assumption. In §2, we will consider how both assumptions can be rejected so as to avoid the problem of divine hiddenness’s conclusion; however, I’ll also note that doing so comes with challenges. Special care will need to be taken either (i) to describe how God might be perfectly loving and yet purposefully hidden from some people or (ii) to explain away non-belief in a friendlier way – in a way that doesn’t rest on a blind arrogance or dogmatism.
This chapter distinguishes the existential problem of divine hiddenness from the evidential problem of divine hiddenness. The former is primarily concerned with the apparent hiddenness of a personal God in the lives of believers amidst terrible suffering. The latter is primarily concerned with the apparent hiddenness of God being evidence against God's existence. The chapter mentions John Schellenberg's landmark book, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, that is the seminal work on the problem of divine hiddenness. The chapter then highlights the basic contours of the evidential problem of divine hiddenness, and suggests that the argument rests on two important assumptions: the perfectly loving assumption and the no-fault assumption. It further considers a few possible responses to the evidential problem of divine hiddenness, which center on rejecting either the perfectly loving assumption or the no-fault assumption.