Jordan Joseph Wales

Influenced by both 17th-century philosophical developments and 21st-century computer science, intelligence today is often defined as “the ability to solve problems.” Drawing on early and medieval Christian thinkers, a theological perspective affords a richer view. For these writers, intellegentia is more than receptive or oriented towards problem-solving. It participates both in the world and in God, by coming to know the world as good not first in how it may serve us but in its kaleidoscopic refraction of the one divine Wisdom, the intellect of God – a refraction that undergirds the latent capacities and potential uses of natural things. Intelligent participation in the world, therefore, is contemplative; the intellegentia passes through the world towards God, its source. In this passage, the diverse echoes of God’s own mind are regathered within the human mind so that the latter becomes ever more an echo of the divine. Theologically understood, this spiritual intelligence entails not only a metaphysics or epistemology of thought, but also a relationship, as the human mind is regathered towards God, known at last not simply as a “highest Good” or first cause and end, but a friend, lover, and, finally, spouse, from whom all things derive their intelligibility as gifts from the triune God who exists by self-gift.

Consulting early and medieval Christian thinkers, I theologically analyze the question of how we are to construe and live well with the sociable robot under the ancient theological concept of “glory”—the manifestation of God’s nature and life outside of himself. First, the oft-noted Western wariness toward robots may in part be rooted in protecting a certain idea of the “person” as a relational subject capable of self-gift. Historically, this understanding of the person derived from Christian belief in God the Trinity, an eternally relational and self-giving God who has created all other things. According to this trinitarian anthropology, the “glory” of God is the manifestation of his life outside of himself, especially in human relationships of self-possessed empathic self-giving. Second, the material world can be drawn into this glorification of God by the invention of technologies, including robots. For Christianity, the personal transcends the material, and matter cannot simply be recombined to make a person. Nonetheless, the material world is a lesser glory that echoes fragmentarily the primal self-gift by which God exists. Human persons can marshal these material powers to serve the personal by the invention of technology, which extends the possibilities of human self-giving and, therefore, of God’s “glory.” Third, this Christian account of creation and technology shapes medieval Christian writings on humanoid robots. These “automata” uniquely draw together nature’s deep powers, but they lack true personal interiority and so cannot give themselves. Instead, they are instruments by which humans’ own relational personhood can be developed or degraded. At best, a robotic image of personhood can serve as an “icon,” directing us back to the relationality by which humans echo God. At worst, robots serve as “idols” when they become substitutes for human companions, drawing their users into a utilitarian frame that excludes self-gift by simply mirroring back to the user his or her own aims. I illustrate these outcomes by two medieval legends. In one, robots function iconically as social facilitators; in the other, as ambiguous romantic partners. And fourth, looking to an actual renaissance-era “praying” robot, I will propose that the non-subjective robot might yet “glorify God” within the religious community by representing the prayers of particular humans—thus iconically standing for rather than idolatrously standing in for the relational subject.