The design, testing and implementation of Virginia’s NOx allowance auction

David Porter; Stephen Rassenti; William Shobe; Vernon Smith; Abel Winn

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2007.09.007

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The design, testing and implementation of Virginia’s NOx allowance auction

Journal article

Peer reviewed

The design, testing and implementation of Virginia’s NOx allowance auction

David Porter, Stephen Rassenti, William Shobe, Vernon Smith and Abel Winn

Journal of economic behavior & organization, Vol.69(2), pp.190-200

01/02/2009

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2007.09.007

Abstract

Combinatorial auctions

Experimental economics

Tradeable emission allowances

We report on the design and testing of three auction mechanisms to maximize revenue and efficiency in the sale of two vintages of nitrous oxide emission allowances by the Commonwealth of Virginia in 2004. The three mechanisms considered were a combinatorial sealed bid (CSB) auction, a sequential English clock (SEC) auction, and a combinatorial English clock (CEC) auction. We find the SEC and CEC mechanisms to be superior the CSB when demand is relatively elastic.

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Details

Title: The design, testing and implementation of Virginia’s NOx allowance auction
Creators - without role: David Porter - Chapman University
Stephen Rassenti - Chapman University
William Shobe - University of Virginia
Vernon Smith - Chapman University
Abel Winn - Wichita State University
Publication Details: Journal of economic behavior & organization, Vol.69(2), pp.190-200
Publisher: Elsevier B.V
Identifiers: 991019505386107081
Academic Unit: Economics and Business Administration
Language: English
Resource Type: Journal article