Abstract
Katherine Dormandy argues that there is no partiality in virtuous faith. Partiality biases and leads to noetic entrenchment. In response, I contend there is an important sense in which virtuous faith is partial towards its object. Namely, it disposes one to perceive the object as more trustworthy and to rely on this partialist evidence in forming beliefs, even when the impartialist evidence (the evidence available to everyone) points in the other direction. There are, after all, situations in which impartialist evidence is apt to mislead or to fail to bring one to the truth. In such cases, faith attunes one to the subject's true motivations and intentions. Here the partiality of faith constitutes a kind of social acuity or expertise, not a bias. Indeed, to lack faith in such situations-and to give impartialist evidence equal weight with the partial-might constitute a kind of bias against the subject, casting his or her actions in an overly negative light.